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Technology is unavoidable in today’s world. It surrounds us daily; most of
our lives require technology in some way or another. But even as society’s
reliance increases, privacy laws lag behind.1 As a result, certain technologies
are especially vulnerable to warrantless searches, such as cloud stored
information.2 Federal law, in the form of the Stored Communications Act
(SCA), provides little safety for cloud data.3 And the Fourth Amendment may
not be any better.4
Although the Fourth Amendment shelters citizens’ “homes, papers, and
effects” from warrantless searches and seizures, the Supreme Court’s third-party
doctrine, which allows for “warrantless searches and seizures of information
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Protecting Users’ Data, 69 STAN. L. REV. 867, 870 (2017).
2. H. Brian Holland, A Cognitive Theory of the Third-Party Doctrine and Digital Papers,
91 TEMP. L. REV. 55, 64 (2018).
3. Johnson, supra note 1, at 877–78.
4. Holland, supra note 2, at 75.
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entrusted to third parties,” may overcome any constitutional protection afforded
to cloud stored data.5 When the Supreme Court established this doctrine in the
1970s, commercial cloud storage was not even a thought, let alone a reality.6
More than 40 years later, cloud storage might be an extension of everyday
society.7 Citizens’ most intimate information—from medical records to
business documents—is stored on these servers.8 As a result, broad application
of the third-party doctrine by the government is an ever-growing concern.
If the third-party doctrine applies to cloud services, the government could
obtain personal files with a simple subpoena or court order.9 To obtain a
subpoena, little evidence is required and, there is no judicial oversight; as long
as internal policies are followed, the subpoena will generally be granted.10 A
court order requires judicial consent, but it still does not rise to the evidentiary
level of warrants; a warrant requires probable cause and particularity—both of
which a judge reviews.11
One does not have to work for the government to understand the myriad of
“potential benefits of such [unencumbered] digital investigations.”12 Take your
own cloud storage as an example. It probably contains photos, documents, and
medical files—your “entire digital life.”13 This amount of information would
take minutes to collect with a simple download; a standard investigation
collecting this information could take years. For agencies that want to solve
crimes quickly, what better way than to search a personal cloud account?14
In the coming years, there will be no shortage of third-party doctrine cases
involving cloud services: “16 percent of Americans own a smart speaker” (e.g.,

5. Johnson, supra note 1, at 871; Aaron J. Gold, Obscured by Clouds: The Fourth
Amendment and Searching Cloud Storage Accounts Through Locally Installed Software, 56 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 2321, 2322 (2015).
6. 2006: Storage in the Cloud, THE STORAGE ENGINE (Sept. 11, 2015),
https://www.computerhistory.org/storageengine/storage-in-the-cloud/.
7. Eunice Park, Objects, Places and Cyber-Spaces Post-Carpenter: Extending the ThirdParty Doctrine Beyond CSLI: A Consideration of IoT and DNA, 21 YALE J. L. & TECH. 1, 16
(2019); Holland, supra note 2, at 73–77.
8. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018).
9. Vania Mia Chaker, Your Spying Smartphone: Individual Privacy is Narrowly
Strengthened in Carpenter v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court’s Most Recent Fourth
Amendment Ruling, 23 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 13–14 (2018).
10. Id. at 14.
11. Dylan Bonfigli, Note, Get A Warrant: A Bright-Line Rule for Digital Searches Under the
Private-Search Doctrine, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 307, 312 (2017); Erin Murphy, The Politics of Privacy
in the Criminal Justice System: Information Disclosure, the Fourth Amendment, and Statutory Law
Enforcement Exemptions, 111 MICH. L. REV. 485, 518 (2013).
12. Chaker, supra note 9, at 13.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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Amazon Echo),15 81% of Americans own a smartphone,16 over 500 million
people are actively using Dropbox,17 and Google Drive currently boasts one
billion users.18 Because all these devices or programs use cloud-based systems,
the third-party doctrine could possibly be used to access their cloud data.19
As cases start to emerge, courts will turn to the recent Supreme Court case
Carpenter v. United States for guidance.20 Carpenter addressed two issues: a
person’s reasonable expectation of privacy in cell-site location information
(CSLI) and the application of the third-party doctrine to obtain this
information.21 For Fourth Amendment protections to exist in cloud information,
“users must have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cloud stored
data.”22 For brevity, this paper will assume that this requirement is met and only
focus on the third-party doctrine. 23
This Paper argues that the third-party doctrine does not apply to cloud data,
and that a warrant is necessary to search and seize information stored in the
cloud. To arrive at this conclusion, it first analyzed the Supreme Court’s creation
of the third-party doctrine and its subsequent evolution. The second part outlines
cloud storage and data. The third part discusses why cloud data should be secure
from warrantless searches. Lastly, this Paper explains why Congress needs to
legislate this issue—not the Courts—and offers recommendations on how to do
so.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Carpenter
Since the Supreme Court issued its opinion on Carpenter, it has received
significant attention from legal scholars and for good reason. The Court’s

15. Sarah Perez, 39 Million Americans Now Own a Smart Speaker, Report Claims, TECH
CRUNCH (Dec. 1, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/01/12/39-million-americans-now-own-asmart-speaker-report-claims/.
16. Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.pewinternet.org/factsheet/mobile/.
17. Trefis Team, Dropbox is Doing Well, But Looks Rich in the Face of Industry Headwinds,
FORBES (May 21, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2018/05/21/dropbox-isdoing-well-but-looks-rich-in-the-face-of-industry-headwinds/#2beab95e36ed.
18. Shoshana Wodinsky, Google Drive is About to Hit 1 Billion Users, THE VERGE (July 25,
2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/7/25/17613442/google-drive-one-billion-users.
19. Rob Thubron, Apple Served with Search Warrant to Access Texas Shooter’s iPhone,
iCloud Account, TECHSPOT (Nov. 19, 2017), https://www.techspot.com/news/71947-apple%20served-search-warrant-access-texas-shooter-iphone.html.
20. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
21. Park, supra note 7, at 11–12.
22. Johnson, supra note 1, at 885.
23. Id. at 885–86; Gold, supra note 5, at 56 (Because Carpenter held that Carpenter did have
a reasonable expectation of privacy for his CSLI, the Court likely would not find cloud storage
users lacking this right.).
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analysis revolutionized the third-party doctrine. This doctrine no longer consists
of three elements but several other factors that some have argued narrow its
application.24 To be sure, the Court itself characterized Carpenter as a “narrow”
decision.25 But a narrow ruling should not be conflated with narrow
consequences; Carpenter’s extension is likely far greater than most realize.26
1. Technological Background
At its core, Carpenter is about location information provided by cell phones
to cell-sites.27 Cell phones are continuously searching for the best signal, which
is why they generally connect to the closest cell-site.28 Modern phones
constantly search for cell-sites even when the owner is not using the phone; all
that is required is for the phone be turned on.29 When a cell phone connects to
a cell-site, “it generates a time-stamped record known as cell-site location
information (CSLI).”30 The more location information produced, the easier it is
to determine someone’s location.31 Although phone companies create, collect,
and store CSLI for their own business purposes, Carpenter explained how the
government can use this information in criminal investigations.32
2. Factual Background
In 2011, the FBI arrested four men for a string of local robberies.33 After
being questioned by the FBI, a defendant confessed and turned over his 15
accomplices.34 The FBI then reviewed this defendant’s call records to identify
other possible suspects.35 From this evidence, the FBI learned of several other
suspects, including Timothy Carpenter.36
Using this information, prosecutors obtained Carpenter’s CSLI through the
Store Communications Act (SCA), “which authorizes courts to grant orders for
telecommunications records.”37 This particular section of the SCA requires a
higher standard of proof than a subpoena but less than a warrant.38 When served

24. Chaker, supra note 9, at 17.
25. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018).
26. Park, supra note 7, at 13; Chaker, supra note 9, at 17.
27. Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2211–12.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 2211.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 2211–12.
32. Id. at 2212.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.; Mihailis E. Diamantis, Privileging Privacy: Confidentiality as a Source of Fourth
Amendment Protection, 21 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 485, 533–34 (2018).
38. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2210.
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with this court order, Carpenter’s wireless carriers provided CSLI for the
specific “four-month period when the string of robberies occurred.”39 This
information helped prove that Carpenter was near the robberies when they
occurred; although his CSLI could only show his whereabouts “between a half
mile and two mile” radius.40 That said, the FBI used this evidence to charge
Carpenter with aiding and abetting robbery.41
Carpenter argued that the warrantless seizure of his CSLI violated his Fourth
Amendment rights, and that the evidence should have been suppressed.42 Both
lower courts rejected this argument, and the appellate court explained that when
Carpenter shared his CSLI to these third-parties, he waived any Fourth
Amendment rights attached to the information.43
3. Majority Opinion44
In Carpenter, the sole issue was whether the government violated the Fourth
Amendment when it accessed Carpenter’s CSLI without a warrant.45 Although
CSLI is held by a third-party, the Court explained that the “unique nature” of
this information outweighed this outside control.46 For this reason, the Court
held that Carpenter’s CSLI still possessed Fourth Amendment protections.47
How the Court arrived at this conclusion is what matters for future third-party
doctrine cases.
Carpenter discussed the third-party doctrine at length and reconfigured its
meaning.48 But before one can understand how Carpenter changed this doctrine,
the two cases that helped create it must be considered: United States v. Miller49
and Smith v. Maryland.50
Miller established the third-party doctrine.51 It held that once an individual
voluntarily turned over documents to a bank—they became the bank’s business
records—and a constitutional privacy interest ceased to exist in the documents.52
Once the bank had these records, they were used in the bank’s “ordinary course

39. Id. at 2212.
40. Id. at 2212–13, 2225 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 2212.
42. Id.
43. Susan Freiwald & Stephen Wm. Smith, The Carpenter Chronicle: A Near-Perfect
Surveillance, 132 HARV. L. REV. 205, 217–18 (2018).
44. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2206, 2211.
45. Id. at 2212.
46. Id. at 2217.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 2216–17, 2219–22.
49. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
50. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
51. Miller, 425 U.S. at 444.
52. Id.
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of business.”53 Important to Miller’s analysis was that the bank was not simply
an intermediary for these transactions but a necessary party.54 And the
documents, which were created for commercial transactions, underscored
Miller’s reduced expectation of privacy.55
Miller’s belief that the documents would be “used only for a limited purpose”
did not help him reclaim his lost Fourth Amendment protections.56 When Miller
voluntarily exposed his information to the bank, he assumed the risk that the
bank would provide the information to the government.57 Thus, he no longer
held an expectation of privacy in the documents.58
Smith59 applied the same doctrine a few years later. In Smith, the government
used a pen register to record phone numbers dialed on a landline telephone.60
The Court ruled that the third-party doctrine applied, and that this action did not
constitute a search.61 Telephone users generally know that dialed numbers are
conveyed to phone companies and recorded for “legitimate business
purposes.”62 In like manner, most people are aware of pen registers’ existence
and functions.63 Smith also explained that the technology used here by law
enforcement provided only “limited capabilities”; they could only access the
numbers dialed, not the content of the call, limiting the information gathered to
the parties’ identities.64 As a result, Smith did not have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in his dialed phone numbers.65
In short, Miller and Smith applied a doctrine that allows the government to
obtain information without a warrant from a third-party if: “(1) information [is]
voluntarily disclosed (2) for use by a third-party (3) in its normal course of
business.”66 Until Carpenter, if these elements were met, the third-party
doctrine could apply.67 But Carpenter not only expanded the meaning of some
of the original elements, it also created new factors for consideration.

53. Id. at 442–43.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 443.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
60. Id. at 737.
61. Id. at 742–44.
62. Id. at 743 (“Telephone users, in sum, typically know that they must convey numerical
information to the phone company; that the phone company has facilities for recording this
information; and that the phone company does in fact record this information for a variety of
legitimate business purposes.”).
63. Id. at 742.
64. Id. at 742–43.
65. Id. at 744.
66. Johnson, supra note 1, at 883.
67. Id.
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Because Carpenter revealed his location to his wireless providers, the
government argued that the third-party doctrine provided access to this
information.68 Undeniably, Carpenter provided information to a third-party, his
wireless carriers, which used this information in their normal course of
business.69 For that reason, the second and third elements were met.70 But the
Court reasoned that Carpenter did not voluntarily share this information, failing
the first element of the third-party doctrine.71 As part of its analysis of this
element, Carpenter focused on the essential role of cell phones in today’s society
and Carpenter’s awareness of how wireless carriers collected CSLI.72
Cell phones are integral to modern society.73 People use cell phones for many
reasons: to set their calendars, to work on documents, to call co-workers, friends,
and family.74 Without cell phones, people would not have meaningful
participation in society.75 And because of this essentialness, the owner is
stripped of a voluntary choice on whether to own a cell phone; by extension, the
owner does not voluntarily share his CSLI either.76
Awareness shared a similar fate. As long as a cell phone is on, it will
continuously connect to local cell-sites.77 So the only affirmative act necessary
to create CSLI is turning the phone on.78 And the only way to avoid CSLI
collection is to disconnect the phone from the network.79 Carpenter explained
that users do not intentionally turn over “a comprehensive dossier of [their]
physical movements” by the simple act of leaving their phone on.80 Unlike
Miller and Smith’s affirmative acts that provided the information, the wireless
carriers in Carpenter received the information automatically following a simple,
unrelated act.81 Turning a phone on does not create an awareness that CSLI is
being collected; it is generally understood that bank documents are used for
commercial transactions and phone providers record phone numbers for
business purposes.82

68. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216–17 (2018).
69. Id. at 2217.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2220. The United States is home to 70 million more cell phone accounts than people.
Id. at 2211.
72. Id. at 2220.
73. Id. at 2218.
74. Id. at 2262 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 2220.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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Carpenter did not only rely on the original elements of the third-party doctrine
to reach its conclusion.83 As the Court explained, although a reduced
constitutional expectation of privacy exists when “information [is] knowingly
shared with another,” this fact is not dispositive in third-party cases.84 Carpenter
established three new third-party factors: (1) the scope of the personal
information accessed, (2) the nature of the information accessed, and (3) the
technological features of the respective technology.85
Carpenter’s scope of information exceeds the information at issue in previous
Supreme Court third-party doctrine cases. Miller and Smith granted access to
“limited types of personal information.”86 But Carpenter’s CSLI provided a
window not only into the defendant’s location but also his personal life.87
Smith’s landline provider could only record the numbers dialed; through CSLI,
wireless providers not only receive the numbers dialed by the user but also a
“detailed and comprehensive record of the person’s movements.”88 With a few
inferences, where someone travels can provide insight into their “familial,
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”89 And because a cell
phone is basically an extension of the human body—it travels everywhere.90
But the scope of information is not confined to present movements or
associations.91 Wireless carriers maintain CSLI for up to five years, which
provides a retrospective surveillance no other technology or person can offer.92
And if this information is properly interpreted, the government can learn a
person’s past, present—and maybe—future movements.93 Although not the
equivalent of the surveillance in George Orwell’s “1984,”94 this development is
still concerning.95
The second factor examined the nature of the information that Carpenter
provided his wireless carriers.96 Carpenter noted that “CSLI is an entirely
different species of business record” than the bank documents in Miller or the

83. Id. at 2219 (“In mechanically applying the third-party doctrine to this case, the
Government fails to appreciate that there are no comparable limitations on the revealing nature of
CSLI.”).
84. Id.
85. Holland, supra note 2, at 97.
86. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 2217.
89. Id. at 2217.
90. Id. at 2218.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See generally GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949).
95. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218 (“Only the few without cell phones could escape this tireless
and absolute surveillance.”).
96. Holland, supra note 2, at 97.
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phone log in Smith.97 Both Miller and Smith revealed little identifying
information, and Smith revealed no content .98 But CSLI provides sensitive and
revealing information—a window into the “privacies of life.”99 Simply put, an
exhaustive location record is quite different than a few bank documents or a
phone log.100
Carpenter’s last factor focused on the technology behind CSLI.101 The pen
register in Smith provided limited capabilities; the police could see the number
dialed, but the content remained private.102 In contrast, the government in
Carpenter could deduce Carpenter’s location and associations with his CSLI.103
And soon CSLI will be able to pinpoint one’s location, like GPS.104 Moreover,
this technology allows continuous monitoring when a phone is on; a pen register
only collects information when a phone call is made.105 Lastly, CSLI’s
technology provides access to this information in a “remarkably easy, cheap, and
efficient [manner] compared to traditional investigative tools.”106 Information
that would usually take years to gather can be obtained in minutes—at
essentially no cost.107
The Court’s focus on these new factors suggests that it felt uncomfortable
extending this doctrine to exceedingly personal and revealing information.108
But even though Carpenter held that the FBI needed a warrant to obtain the
CSLI, it also warned that this decision was a narrow one.109 Depending on how
future courts interpret this holding, warrantless searches of cloud storage
accounts could be possible.
B. Cloud Storage
Cloud storage provides users with the ability to upload files through the
internet and store them offsite in a third-party owned and operated server.110
Storage services, such as Dropbox or Google Drive, require users to create an
account before uploading their files.111 Once files are uploaded, they will remain

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2222.
Id. at 2219.
Id. at 2217–19; Holland, supra note 2, at 97.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219.
Holland, supra note 2, at 97.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219.
Id. at 2217.
Id. at 2217–18.
Id. at 2217.
Id. at 2217–2218.
Id.
Id. at 2217–19; Chaker, supra note 9, at 10.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
Johnson, supra note 1, at 872.
Id. at 892.
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on the servers as long as the account remains active.112 Some providers also
allow users to edit, share, and copy their files on the cloud, providing a cloud
computing component.113
Although most cloud services are password protected, most lack
encryption.114 Password protection still permits storage providers to access the
information.115 And even if the service offers an encryption option, encryption
does not always provide absolute protection. Data can still be backed up on
other servers, which would allow the provider to access the information.116 If
the provider does so, depending on the terms of service, it may collect or scan
the information for “business purposes.”117
The information collected from stored files comes from two main sources:
data and metadata.118 To illustrate, consider a Word document. The words
within the document are data; the “origin, purpose, time, geographic location,
creator, access, and terms of use of the data” are all metadata.119 In essence,
metadata is “data about data.”120 As metadata increases over time, it “can be
more telling than the content” of the respective files.121 Metadata can reveal a
“detailed account of one’s interests, activities, and associations.”122 And even if
a file is deleted, the “deleted data still remains in the cloud for a certain period
of time.”123
Some service providers also collect other information not associated with
uploaded files.124 This information includes the previous website visited before
using the cloud service, “the device and software used to access the service,”
and the searches within the cloud program.125 This information coupled with
112. Id. at 873.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 873–74.
116. Johnson, supra note 1, at 873–74.
117. Holland, supra note 2, at 73–75; Johnson, supra note 1, at 873–74.
118. Michael W. Price, Rethinking Privacy: Fourth Amendment “Papers” and the Third-Party
Doctrine, 8 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 247, 274–75 (2016).
119. Data Documentation and Metadata, U. ARIZ. LIB., https://data.library.arizona.edu/datamanagement-tips/data-documentation-and-metadata (last visited Mar. 7, 2020).
120. Thomas H. White, Parol Metadata: New Boilerplate Merger Clauses and the
Admissibility of Metadata Under the Parol Evidence Rule, 4 J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 237, 237 n.1
(2012); Metadata Creation, U.C. SANTA CRUZ U. LIBR., https://guides.library.ucsc.edu/
c.php?g=618773 (last visited Mar. 7, 2020).
121. Price, supra note 117, at 275–76.
122. Jennifer Daskal, Law Enforcement Access to Data Across Borders: The Evolving Security
and Rights Issues, 8 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 473, 485 (2016).
123. Sarit K. Mizrahi, The Dangers of Sharing Cloud Storage: The Privacy Violations Suffered
by Innocent Cloud Users During the Course of Criminal Investigations in Canada and the United
States, 25 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 303, 320–21 (2017).
124. Scott A. McDonald, Authenticating Digital Evidence from the Cloud, ARMY LAW. 40, 48
(2014).
125. Id.
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the data and metadata from uploaded files could provide the government with
an unprecedented look into someone’s life.126
II. ANALYSIS
A. Cloud Information Should Be Secure from Warrantless Searches
For the third-party doctrine’s voluntary element, Carpenter focused on two
issues: (1) the essential role cell phones hold in today’s society and (2)
Carpenter’s awareness of how his wireless carriers collected his CSLI.127
Because cell phones are a social necessity, Carpenter explained that mere
ownership of a cell phone does not suggest CSLI is voluntarily shared.128
But is cloud storage necessary to engage in modern life? It has certainly
experienced a “wide social adoption” like cell phones.129 And much of personal
information has shifted from personal storage to remote cloud storage.130 In fact,
users are being forced to use cloud services because they are producing more
data than their devices can store, and cloud storage is the best option available.131
Moreover, the alternatives to cloud storage do not eliminate the cloud’s
essentialness.132 Although external hard drives offer many of the same functions
as cloud services, their accessibility is inadequate in comparison.133 External
hard drive access is limited to the physical device itself, and generally, only one
person can connect to the specific device.134 By contrast, many users can access
cloud information in real-time.135
126. Price, supra note 117, at 275–76.
127. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018).
128. Id.
129. Park, supra note 7, at 16; Holland, supra note 2, at 73–75 (Because Carpenter does seem
to equate total number of users with essentialness, the significant number of cloud users could be
dispositive for this question).
130. Aya Hoffman, Lost in the Cloud: The Scope of the Private Search Doctrine in a CloudConnected World, 68 SYRACUSE L. REV. 277, 286 (2018); Andrew Keane Woods, Against Data
Exceptionalism, 68 STAN. L. REV. 729, 739–41 (2016).
131. Diamantis, supra note 36, at 503–04; Laurie Buchan Serafino, ”I Know My Rights, So
You Go’n Need a Warrant for That”: The Fourth Amendment, Riley’s Impact, and Warrantless
Searches of Third-Party Clouds, 19 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 154, 161 (2014).
132. Stalina Zoir, Cloud Storage vs External Hard Disk Drive: Which One is Better?, TECH
RADAR (June 18, 2018), https://www.techradar.com/news/cloud-storage-vs-external-hard-diskdrive-which-one-is-better.
133. Id. Lincoln Specter, Cloud Storage Alternatives: Three Ways to Sync Your Own Data
Securely and Privately, PC WORLD (July 30, 2015), https://www.pcworld.com/article/2940646/
cloud-storage-alternatives-three-ways-to-sync-your-own-data-securely-and-privately.html
(discussing other storage options).
134. Adam W. Snukal et al., Cloud Computing—Transcending the Cloud: A Legal Guide to
the Risks and Rewards of Cloud Computing, Part One, 65 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 57, 58 (2011);
Mark Wilson, Castle in the Cloud: Modernizing Constitutional Protections for Cloud-Stored Data
on Mobile Devices, 43 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 261, 263 (2013).
135. Wilson, supra note 133, at 263.
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Without general access, external hard drives force users to share stored data
by email, flash drive, or using the same device.136 Imagine having to carry this
device everywhere you went, sitting down, plugging it into your laptop,
downloading documents from it, and then sharing those documents by email.
Now imagine going through this process every time you needed to share files
from your external hard drive. This method is unrealistic in today’s world. And
what if the file is too large to share by email? Gmail only allows emails to
contain files below 25 megabytes, and most other email providers have a stricter
data limit.137 Today’s world requires speed, access, and reliability—only the
cloud can provide all three of these features.138 Cloud storage is not merely
beneficial to everyday life, it is essential.139
The second issue considers a cloud user’s awareness that their data is
collected. In effect, does uploading files to a cloud service create an awareness
that this information is being collected? People who turn over bank documents
or make phone calls generally know that the information from their documents
or phone numbers are collected.140 Banks and phone companies have to record
this information for business purposes. But other than the terms of service, there
is no reason cloud users would know that their data is being collected.141
Uploading files to a cloud service is like Carpenter’s act of leaving his phone
on—neither create an awareness that companies are collecting the information
the individual created.142 Because of the cloud’s essentialness and the user’s
lack of awareness that their data is collected, cloud users do not voluntarily share
their data with cloud providers.
The third-party doctrine’s second and third elements require a third-party to
use the information collected for business purposes.143 Depending on the terms
of service offered by the cloud provider, the user’s data may not be “used” in the
sense Carpenter, Miller, or Smith understood this term to mean.144 Terms of
service define “the amount of privacy the user relinquishes”, and we must be
careful not to conflate access with use.145 Some providers will scan uploaded
136. Daniel E. Harmon, The State of Data Storage, 34 No. 6 LAWPC 1, 1–2 (2016).
137. Maximum Email Size Limit for Gmail, Outlook.com, etc., OUTLOOK APPS (July 19, 2013),
https://www.outlook-apps.com/maximum-email-size/.
138. Bryan R. Kelly, #privacyprotection: How the United States Can Get its Head Out of the
Sand and into the Clouds to Secure Fourth Amendment Protections for Cloud Journalists, 55
WASHBURN L.J. 669, 696–97 (2016); Serafino, supra note 130, at 161; Wilson, supra note 133, at
279 (“It’s no answer to suggest . . . that people can avoid these hazards by not storing their data
electronically.”).
139. Hoffman, supra note 129, at 286; Serafino, supra note 130, at 172–173.
140. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 438
(1976).
141. Johnson, supra note 1, at 891.
142. Id. at 891–92.
143. Id. at 883.
144. Id. at 895–96; Gold, supra note 5, at 2342–43.
145. Johnson, supra note 1 at 898–99; Gold, supra note 5, at 2342–43.
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cloud data “for the security, stability, and control of the network”, while other
providers will not only have access to the data but use information from this
data.146 If cloud providers use the data pulled from uploaded files for business
purposes, the third-party “usage” requirement would be met.147 But if the cloud
provider simply scans the information, this element would not be satisfied.
Carpenter’s first new factor considered the scope of the personal information
accessed.148 At any time, a cloud user may upload and store receipts, medical
files, personal photos, and business documents to their account.149 Although
CSLI cannot provide specific location, metadata can.150 Both metadata and data
can reveal a person’s “familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual
associations.”151 And unlike CSLI, few to no inferences need to be made to
understand this information.152 But much like the retrospective aspect of CSLI,
even after a file is deleted, its data can remain in the cloud.153
Carpenter’s second factor focused on the nature of the information
accessed.154 The nature of information provided by cloud data is inherently
sensitive and revealing, which is why storage providers offer password protected
access and, sometimes, encryption.155 But cloud information “is an entirely
different species of business record” than CSLI.156 CSLI cannot provide the
type of personal information that cloud data can; cloud data can provide
someone’s “entire digital life,” their specific location, and many other details—
all requiring few to no inferences to understand the data.157 By contrast, CSLI
can only show someone’s location within “a half mile and two mile” radius.158
And without inferences or other evidence, this information is useless.159
Carpenter’s last factor examined the various technological features
underlying the respective software.160 Some cloud providers’ terms of service
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and software allow them to access personal cloud data.161 Terms of service can
permit even more access, allowing for automated uploads and the “pervasive
collection of information.”162 Either way, government access to this information
has the power to make traditional investigative tools obsolete.163 Cloud data is
centrally located, extensive, and requires little effort to collect.164 But most
importantly, its access is cheap—no wiretaps, extra agents, or overtime are
necessary to gather it—just a simple data request.165 Like Carpenter, this type
of technology provides access to information “on a scale that was not
technologically feasible a short while ago.”166
Overall, cloud data shares more similarities with Carpenter than Miller or
Smith. Cloud storage is essential, and users are unaware that their information
is collected after they upload files. Thus, the voluntary element is not met.
Depending on the terms of service, the data might not be used by the cloud
provider. However, most cloud services do use customers’ data for business
purposes.167 Therefore, this element would likely be met. Even so, the scope of
personal cloud information and its nature are more extensive and sensitive than
CSLI’s scope and nature. Moreover, cloud technology mirrors the technology
behind CSLI.168 As a result, after Carpenter, the third-party doctrine should not
apply to cloud storage services.169
B. Congress’s Role
More than 40 years ago the Supreme Court created the third-party doctrine.170
At its inception, it was impossible for any judge—even Supreme Court
Justices—to appreciate how society’s reliance on technology would create a
“seismic shift” in the doctrine’s reach.171 Consider the fact that it was not until
30 years after Miller established the third-party doctrine that cloud storage
became commercially available.172 And by no means was its use as prevalent as
it is today.173 The Court tried to rein in the doctrine’s reach with Carpenter;
perhaps it did. But until courts address warrantless searches of cloud data, it is
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pure speculation whether this data retains Fourth Amendment protections. To
wait and hope for favorable application of Carpenter in these cases is to gamble
with each individual’s cloud privacy.
Instead, Congress needs to address cloud privacy with legislation.174 Cloud
storage is a highly complicated area that requires a depth of fact-finding and
deliberating not suited for the judicial system.175 Of course, Congress has not
always been reliable at legislating technological issues, but Congress’s struggles
should not provoke a judicial response.176
Statutes provide much more latitude and stability than judicial precedent.177
Statutes can require notice to the individual affected by the search, which gives
them the ability to respond through legal channels.178 Statutes can require a
higher standard of proof than warrants, such as clear and convincing evidence.179
Statutes can create exceptions. For example, national security issues are
exempted from the SCA’s requirements.180 Finally, statutes can control the
government’s use and storage of seized data.181 But the judiciary usually can
only “regulate [the] acquisition of information.”182 At their core, statutes
provide broader, more stable protections than judicial precedent.183
Regrettably, only a small portion of cloud stored data is protected by federal
law, specifically the SCA.184 Congress developed the SCA in the 1980s when
commercial cloud usage was not a reality.185 As a result, Congress created a
framework that protected the only privacy concern at the time—electronic
communications.186
If cloud based data does not involve electronic communications, it is not
protected.187 Suppose you upload a spreadsheet with all your financial
information to Dropbox—this type of information would not be protected by the
SCA because there is no communication involved. But if a Gmail account
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backed up emails into Google Drive, this information would be protected.188 In
effect, the SCA does not protect most cloud data.189
To address cloud privacy, Congress needs to expand the SCA to protect noncommunicative cloud data. Requiring probable cause and a warrant to access
this information would be a welcomed change. But the “procedural protections”
are what matter for cloud privacy, not the document required to obtain the
information, such as a warrant or subpoena.190 Congress should require probable
cause and notice to acquire personal cloud data. It should also create safeguards
to prevent the “unauthorized exposure” of data and compel its destruction after
its use.191 Lastly, it should expand the national security exemption to cover these
requirements.192
The government would violate this statute if it searched a personal cloud
account or used seized information without meeting these requirements. The
trigger for this statute may “over-protect [digital] records”—but it is better to
over-protect than under-protect this type of information.193 And transparency
and clarity are the hallmark of a well-written statute.194 Without these features,
confusion and abuse are inevitable.195 Employing this concrete standard reduces
the chance of either occurring.196 Some may argue that this standard is too rigid.
But suppose law enforcement enters your house without a warrant and searches
your desk. Clearly, this type of entry and search is unlawful.197 Why should
personal cloud information be any different?
A legislative fix would also clarify this issue for defendants, prosecutors, and
private companies.198 Defendants would know their rights; prosecutors would
know their boundaries; and cloud providers would know when it was necessary
to comply with the government.199 As long as this area remains unlegislated,
companies and individuals will face expensive litigation and difficult
decisions.200 Cloud providers do not want customers losing faith in their service,
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which is why they are likely to oppose data requests.201 But a federal statute
provides “legal safe harbors for compliance[,]” freeing companies from difficult
ethical decisions and angry customers.202
Even with a privacy statute that protects cloud information, Congress must do
more. Congress needs to create a law that forces it to revisit digital privacy
statutes on a recurring basis. Keeping pace with rapid technological changes
will not be easy.203 Finding bipartisan support for these laws may be an even
greater hurdle. But with the constant evolution of technology, using 30-year-old
statutes for digital privacy is a recipe for disaster. With this law, Congress will
be forced to examine digital privacy protections more than every 30 years.
III. CONCLUSION
Digital privacy is threatened without statutory protection.204 To be sure, the
government should have “the appropriate legal authority to provide security”
and fulfill its constitutional role.205 At the same time, people must maintain “a
sufficient scope of privacy and autonomy necessary for [their] human
dignity.”206 Here lies the inherent tension. But the recommendations put forth
by this paper accommodate both essential principles.
For those that argue that these suggestions will allow people to “do things they
shouldn’t be doing[,]” I respectfully disagree.207 The proposed statutory
amendment “allow[s] people to live core areas of their personal lives with the
dignity that excludes onlookers.”208 The United States is not a totalitarian
country.209 We have always warned against oppressive behavior in the physical
world, and the digital world should be no different. Armed with wholesale cloud
access, the government could “pursue personal vendettas, target the politically
unpopular,” and trample on other civil liberties.210
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Since 9/11, the government has received “greater investigative latitude” but
extending this ability to warrantless searches of cloud services is unwise.211
Although Carpenter appears to protect cloud data from warrantless searches,
this area is still “ripe for future Supreme Court review.”212 And so, Congress
must act.
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